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CPYRGHT

Younger CIA Agents in Saigon Press for Change in U.S. Policy

Men Go Outside Agency Channels in Effort to Oust Nhu and His Wife

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THE UNUSUALLY OPEN REFERENCES to the Central Intelligence Agency coming out of Saigon lately are due only in part to the breakdown in relations between the Diem regime and the Government of the United States.

CIA agents on the scene complained to press correspondents 10 days ago when they learned that their agency had decided to continue its \$250,000 monthly payments to Col. Le Quang Tung's special forces, which led the raids on Buddhist pagodas on Aug. 21.

The same agents were quoted anonymously in dispatches last weekend as challenging the relatively optimistic reports being sent to Washington by their own chief in Saigon and by the United States Military Assistance Command headed by Gen. Paul D. Harkins.

Harkins and the CIA chief are said to be arguing for continued all-out support of the Viet Name government even if President Ngo Dinh Diem should be replaced by his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu now heads the secret police, and he and his wife are regarded as the most powerful figures in the government.

OUTSPOKEN self-criticism by American officials was a natural result when Viet Name raids on Buddhist pagodas and student demonstrators brought into sharp question the American policy of "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem."

It was not surprising that CIA officials in Viet Nam should join in criticism once it became clear that policy was on the point of cracking up. But a more fundamental reason for the unwanted talkativeness on the part of the CIA agents is an inherent conflict within the agency.

This is a division between the functions of intelligence gathering on the one hand and political action on the other. In agency parlance, the two functions are called, respectively, F. I., for foreign intelligence, and P. P., for political propaganda.

gathering of information — in short, spying. This meant culling foreign publications, collecting telephone books and examining public documents of all sorts, as well as more flamboyant devices, such as double agents, letter drops, hidden microphones, Mata Haris and all the rest.

Communism was the main enemy. Part of this work was keeping track of Soviet diplomats and any other persons thought to be Soviet agents.

The underlying assumption was that Communism was the only enemy and that any person or regime opposed to Communism was automatically on our side. Dictators were acceptable, as long as they were anti-Communist and remained even reasonably polite to the United States.

In any foreign country judged to be friendly by their generous standards, the customary way for CIA to operate was through the police and military security authorities. Just as the ambassador was accredited to the chief of state, the CIA director in a country behaved as if he were accredited to the boss of that country's secret police.

THIS RELATIONSHIP led to such unfortunate episodes as entertainment of Pedro Estrada, the hated secret police chief of the Venezuelan dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez, by top CIA officials and presentation of a medal to him on a visit to the United States.

In the case of Viet Nam, it was standard operating procedure for the CIA director there

to work closely with him and subsidize his storm troopers.

The political-propaganda function came formally into being with a reorganization in 1950. By 1950, it had become evident that the Soviet Union was making headway in India and Italy through undercover political techniques more sophisticated than those employed by CIA. As a result, President Harry S. Truman appointed a committee to study the problem. Allen W. Dulles was the leading member.

On the committee's recommendation, the political-propaganda function was established. Dulles soon became CIA director.

THE NEW DIVISION, staffed mostly by younger men brought in from outside, planned and carried out assistance to opposition groups in other countries, threw its weight on one side or another in national elections and, in some cases, plotted coups or revolutions.

Its most spectacular success was helping Ramon Magsaysay to power in the Philippines. Its worst failure was the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.

The conflict between the two functions was between old hands and newcomers, between men for whom intelligence gathering was an end in itself and those who saw intelligence as material to be used for political goals, between men who valued their sources above all else and those who would use information against a bad secret police chief even though it meant shutting him off as an intelligence source.

In Viet Nam, the younger men, the political-propaganda specialists, believe the United States can no longer afford to keep giving all-out support to a government dominated by persons as unpopular as Nhu and his wife.

They are going outside agency channels in a desperate effort to change United States policy before, as they see it, the Viet

Name people choose Communism — not because they like Communism but because they hate their present government and are losing respect for the American government that supports it.